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Secretary Packard Discusses New Team in Pentagon, Troop Status

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard appeared on Pentagon Forum, a television panel program presented by the Defense Department's Office of Information for the Armed Forces. Questions were asked of Mr. Packard by John C. Broger, Director of IAF, and a panel of four military correspondents: Chief Journalist Tommy Thompson of Commanders Digest, Air Force Master Sergeant Irvin Lee of Television Journal, Marine Staff Sergeant Bob Neely of American Forces Radio-Washington and Army Master Sergeant Paul Van Dyke of The Big Picture.

Q—Most of us know that the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary share equally in responsibility. Could you tell us how this new team is working?

A—Well, I think we are getting along very well working together as a team. The Office of the Secretary of Defense really could be considered more or less as an office with the various activities in the Defense Department reporting to the office. But actually, of course, Secretary Laird is the Chief Executive Officer of the Department and I look on it as my job to work with him, to help him do his job well and to work with him as a team. The job is a large one. There are many things to be done, many problems, and I think it is reasonably appropriate in terms of my experience here that I would even say that it needs at least two men in this job because there are lots of things to do. We are working together trying to keep our policies lined up and our job really is to support Secretary Laird in his basic program.

Let's go to our Correspondents:

Q—Thank you Mr. Broger, Mr. Secretary, you also have additional responsibilities that you carry out on your own initiative along with the teamwork with the Secretary of Defense. Could you tell us about some of those?

A—Well, there are a number of things which I have been doing on my own initiative. Some of these have been established over the years as having been assigned to the Deputy Secretary committees. The Under Secretary's Committee involves the Secretary of State, Defense and other agencies in the Government. A number of activities like that have been carried on in this Administration. There are also a number of things in which we sort of divided up our involvement, and I guess in general, you can say that I have spent a little more time working on some of the programs inside the Pentagon and inside the organization and Secretary Laird has spent a little more time up on the Hill, as most of you know.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard

Q—Another topic which obviously you have an interest in is the redeployment of troops from Vietnam. Could you tell us how does the policy work on finding out which unit or which man is going to be redeployed from Vietnam?

A—Well, the present program, as you know, is to redeploy troops from Vietnam as the South Vietnamese army units are able to undertake the responsibility of maintaining the positions in their respective areas. So the first approach has been to take troops out of those areas where there's strength in South Vietnamese armed forces. That has been the basic move. Now, if we got into some agreement in Paris whereby there was mutual stand-down in troop withdrawals or for some other reasons, policy might

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CIRCULATION COPY

Strong Effort Toward Vietnamizing The War

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be changed. But as of now it is based primarily on the ability of the South Vietnamese armed forces to take over the responsibility in the respective areas.

Q—Mr. Secretary, some of the troops being withdrawn from Vietnam will not immediately be returned to the United States. Will you tell us where they will go and why?

A—Yes. In the first contingent of 25,000 troops that are being withdrawn, 8,000 are being brought back to the United States. The remaining 17,000 are being redeployed to areas in the Pacific, primarily Okinawa and Hawaii to sort of build up the reserve strength in that area.

Q—Will the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam affect the 12-months' tour commitment?

A—For the time being I think the 12-months tour program will continue in effect and will probably continue to operate on that kind of program until you get into some different situations. So I think you can assume that the present 12-months tour of duty will continue in the forseeable future.

Q—Sir, can we take that a step further—some of the benefits that the men serving in Vietnam have—one of them is the privilege of free mail. Do you see this as being taken out now that we are redeploying troops from Vietnam?

A—I don't think any of the benefits which the troops are enjoying now will be taken out until the redeployment withdrawal reaches the point where there are no longer hostilities or no longer a great deal of activity. As you know, a good many of those privileges are based on the definition of Vietnam as a combat zone. If things progressed to the place where it's no longer a combat zone, some change might be involved, but I would think again in the forseeable future, there would be no change in the benefits that the troops have from being stationed in the theater.

Q—Sir, when these organizations are redeployed to either Okinawa or Hawaii or the United States, do they lose their unit integrity, per se? Could you explain this for us?

A—Well, that depends again on what the objective is in particular with the deployment. For example, the Marine units which are being kept in reserve will maintain their unit integrity which is important for them to be ready to undertake whatever assignment may be necessary. The units that are being brought back to the United States, some of the boys are being released—there it's not important that any unit integrity be considered and in that case there has been a little more reassignment before withdrawal so that the young men who have been there for ten months or so will get first preference in the withdrawal.

Q—Sir, as these units are redeployed what effect will this have on combat pay, hazardous duty pay, and tax exemptions?

A—The redeployment will—the effect on pay and these other conditions—will depend upon the areas to which they are redeployed and so that as they are brought out of Vietnam they will no longer get the benefits of the Vietnam theater. So, in general, they will get the benefits that are appropriate for the point to which they are reassigned.

Q—One of the greatest killers of Gold Flow has been the ten percent savings plan. What effect will this have on it?

A—Well, that's been a good plan, as a matter of fact. I think there's been something like 550 million dollars that has been invested by our troops in that program. That was designed to minimize overseas expenditures and have some benefit on the Gold Flow.

There's no thought of changing that as far as Vietnam is concerned. Perhaps when it gets to the place when the conflict is completely over there may be some reconsideration, but I think here again that will remain in effect in the forseeable future.

Q—Well, sir, you talk about the de-escalation of all the men moving back from the front. What is going to be the role now of the serviceman during the de-escalation and during the cease-fire arms situation hostility?

A—Well, there, of course, will be a considerable period of time where we will still have substantial combat troops in the area. There are areas where the ARVN are not yet capable of taking over the full responsibility for security of their section of the country. So we are going to continue to have considerable number of combat troops. There is a very strong and important effort toward Vietnamizing the war, which is simply trying to take those steps which would enable the South Vietnamese to take over their responsibility for their own country. We will have a good many troops assisting in this effort in terms of training, in terms of logistic support and advice, and assistance of various kinds. So I will anticipate that there will be a phase from the present situation toward our larger proportionate involvement in support activities. Certainly as the program continues we hope it will.

Q—Mr. Secretary, I would like to move from Vietnam to another part of the world. What was the purpose of your recent trip to Europe?

A—Well, I felt it very desirable since I have been here not to spend all my time in the office, to get out and see some of the things that are going on at first-hand. I think that you learn a great deal by getting out and meeting the troops, the commanders and in seeing the conditions in the various parts of the Services for which we are responsible and so the primary purpose was to get a first hand feel and an understanding of our situation in NATO. I found it a very interesting and useful trip. I was very highly impressed with the capabilities and dedications and the general attitude, morale of our troops over there. I found it very worthwhile to get a first-hand feel of our responsibilities in the NATO area.

Q—Sir, if we can stay with the European trip for just

the moment, how did the troops in Europe impress you as far as training goes? How did they look in Europe?

A—Well, they looked good. I was quite impressed everywhere I went. I was impressed particularly with the younger officers, and several occasions we had lunch or a meeting. A number of the younger officers were there and they were bright, enthusiastic young men. I can say I was very proud of them. I think we have some areas in which our support isn't quite up to the level we would like to have it. As you know, some of our supplies have been drawn down to some extent over the period of Vietnam involvement, but generally speaking, it looked to me as though we were in pretty good shape and the areas which need improvement are being improved.

Q—Sir, your being in an area where a man has a prerogrative for taking his family, I wonder, when you were in Europe, did you have the chance to meet dependents and how did they feel about being in Europe?

A—Well, I did have a chance to meet some dependents. I didn't have a chance to meet enough to get any cross-sections of how they would feel, but in a good many of the areas the living conditions, the schools and the general location of the troops is such that it should be a good experience for the families, and I suspect the attitude varies with the interest in being in a foreign country. But a good many of them seem to me to be enjoying their experience and which included, of course, getting an opportunity of learning something about some other country.

Q—Sir, I wonder if we might address a couple of questions on the military hardware.

More and more as years go by the equipment is getting more complicated. Is this a trend that's going to continue, do you think?

A—Well, this is a question that I have been interested in and the simple answer to your question is that I think there's going to be a strong trend toward more complicated hardware simply because we are learning how to do things now that could not be done before. One of the things that has contributed to this trend is the capability to what we call micro-miniaturized equipment. You can put a great deal more capability in a given-size package that induces people to want to put more capability on a system to make it more effective, and so forth. And I think this trend will tend to continue. At the same time there is a very serious problem because, as this equipment becomes more complex, the maintenance problems become more difficult and, in my view, there is some reasonably happy medium between complexity and practical usefulness under field conditions. We are looking at some specific problems in this area, and I think, in some ways, perhaps there's been a tendency to make some equipment a little bit more complex than is practical. But again, getting back to the basic question, the long term trends are going to be toward more complexity and more capability.

Q—Sir, we talked about equipment. I would like to turn to people who operate—what is your basic approach to personnel policy as pertains to career men?

A—Well, I have a very simple approach to personnel policy and I guess it starts from the fundamental proposition that the strength and capability of any enterprise is depending primarily entirely on the capability of the people. And so I would tend to put much more emphasis on the importance of people in the organization than on the importance of systems and procedures and the ways of doing things in a formal manner. In terms of the people in uniform, we have a number of things we are hoping to do to provide better opportunities for our young men in the service to get an education so that they can be better able to find a place in the civilian economy when they come out and to do things that will put a little more emphasis on th importance of the individual. In the management of the other aspects of the organization, we are moving toward giving more responsibility to various management teams in the department and toward trying to decentralize our activities. It's my view when we have as many people as we have in the Department of Defense it is impossible for anybody sitting topside to make all the decisions. The decisions ought to be made to the extent possible by the people who are responsible for implementing those decisions. And we are working in that direction.

Q—Mr. Secretary, along with personnel problems, family separations to short unaccompanied tours for the most part outside of Europe—they are causing considerable dislocation and retention problems. What's the DoD doing now to alleviate this?

A—Well, I think I can start by saying we are of course concerned about this problem. There are areas where it will continue to be impossible to have the families accompany the servicemen and we will continue to

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VISIT VIETNAM BATTLE ZONE—General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (wearing sun glasses) is accompanied by U.S. Pacific Commander, Admiral John S. McCain (far left); General Creighton W. Abrams, Commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam (right front); and U.S. Army XXIV CORPS Commander, Lieutenant General Melvin Zais during a visit in mid-July to Hq., III Marine Amphibious Force, Da Nang, Vietnam in the northernmost Corps Tactical Zone. The field visit was part of a four-day on-the-scene review of U.S. military operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

Aggression or Detente?

TESTING SOVIET INTENTIONS

Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson recently discussed U.S.-Soviet relations in a commencement address at Emerson College in Boston. Welcoming the keen interest of this generation of students in foreign affairs, he discussed differing views of what U.S. policy should be in today's "more relaxed international atmosphere." Part I of excerpts from his speech of June 8 appeared in COMMANDERS DIGEST last week. Below is Part II.

Even while your generation has witnessed the continuing upward spiral of the arms race, it has also seen a lessening of cold-war tensions. Since Stalin, Soviet policies have changed and moderated.

[Today] an influential new segment of U.S. public opinion has called into question the continuing relevance of the security arrangements built to meet the threat of an aggressive, expansionist Russia.

Where the point of view of those who would maintain our existing defense structure and the point of view of those who would contract it begin to diverge is in their differing appraisals of the continuing external threat to our security.

Differing Interpretations of Soviet Threat

Certainly it is possible to reach two quite different interpretations of the threat posed by the Soviet Union:

• The first stresses the moderated nature of Soviet policy and its apparent willingness to seek out and negotiate areas of common or parallel interest. This interpretation doubts that the Soviet Union any longer pursues overriding imperialist ambitions and holds that the Soviet defense posture is oriented primarily toward protecting the USSR's own security. This view also points to the Soviet preoccupation with its own domestic affairs—its agricultural problems and its efforts to meet growing consumer demands. It sees Soviet society becoming more conservative as its bureaucracies develop vested interests in the status quo. In sum, this view sees Russian communism losing momentum as practical needs become more insistent and ideological fervor wanes.

• The second interpretation, though it would not necessarily quarrel with all of these assertions, is not persuaded that basic Soviet attitudes are much changed or that the threat to our security is significantly diminished. As indications that the Soviet Union's fundamentally aggressive policies remain unchanged, it points to the continuing buildup of Soviet military strength, to the spread of Soviet power into the Mediterranean and the Middle East, to last year's brutal military occupation of Czechoslovakia, to Soviet support of the irresponsible regime in North Korea and Soviet backing of Hanoi.

Both interpretations are held by experienced and knowledgeable men, close students of the Soviet Union. On the basis of the evidence we now have available, an impressive case can be built up for each. And that, I think, is exactly the trouble. We simply do not have enough solid evidence to support either view conclusively.

What Are Moscow's Policies?

Like our own country, the Soviet Union is a large and complex society containing many diverse and competing interests. We are aware that ferment and pressures for liberalization exist beneath the surface. But we do not know if these pressures can or will emerge. Nor can we be sure what group or set of attitudes will be dominant. We cannot even take for granted that the gradual reorientation that appears to be taking place will continue.

'We are aware that ferment and pressures for liberalization exist beneath the surface. But we do not know if these pressures can or will emerge.'

Given this uncertainty about Soviet policies, we have two choices. One is to rely on the hunch that the danger has abated and on this basis reduce the scale of our defensive effort. The other is to conclude that we cannot afford the risk of being wrong.

Faced with this choice, how can we fail to take the

second course? As President Nixon recently said: *"I do not consider my recommendations infallible. But if I have made a mistake, I pray that it is on the side of too much and not too little."*

This does not mean that we must necessarily be, however, backed forever into an upward spiral or arms expenditures. As the President also said:

"I believe we must take risks for peace—but calculated risks, not foolish risks. We shall not trade our defenses for a disarming smile or charming words. We are prepared for new initiatives in the control of arms in the context of other specific moves to reduce tensions around the world."

The key to unlocking this spiral and reversing its direction lies, I am convinced, in the success with which we are able to carry out the "specific moves" referred to by the President. It will take energy and resourcefulness. It will take imagination. It will take hard bargaining. But only thus can we hope to obtain solid, up-to-date evidence bearing on current Soviet policies.

Testing Soviet Intentions

The point of departure for any such move is a specific situation of tension, one which breeds conflict and holds a significant risk of confrontation between the Soviet Union and ourselves. The Middle East is one such situation. Vietnam is another. Berlin access is a third.

'Certainly it is possible to reach two quite different interpretations of the threat posed by the Soviet Union.'

The next step must be to seek the opportunity to put forward proposals for a satisfactory resolution of the problem—proposals we believe to be valid and reasonable, not just asking crises to be reduced under pressure. The manner in which the Soviets respond to this approach can afford one test of their intentions. Have they met us halfway? Has our attempt to be reasonable received a reasonable reply? Are the negotiations being conducted in good faith?

If a settlement can be reached, another test of Soviet intentions will be the manner in which it is carried out. Even if no settlement is reached, there may nevertheless be some degree of mutuality of understanding in an agreement to disagree. But if, on the other hand, agreement is obstructed willfully and capriciously, then we shall at least have gained enough evidence that the old intransigence has not been moderated.

In this process we must recognize that neither we nor the Soviet Union can encompass all the factors bearing on a given problem. Our respective allies have vital and legitimate interests. These practical restrictions must be taken into account, and that is another reason why a series of negotiations is needed.

'If we are to find out more precisely where we are in East-West relations, we must gain new evidence. . . . We must strive to replace antagonism with analysis and negation with negotiation.'

A Continuing Task

Nor will it be enough, quite obviously, that any single step in such a series has succeeded. The task of identifying, negotiating, and resolving situations of tension must be a continuing one, and only as it is gradually accomplished will we be justified in significant modification of our own policies.

The process will take time. It will demand patience, as well as ingenuity and skill. The suspicions and distrust accumulated over two decades cannot be dispelled quickly. Just as tensions were progressively heightened during the early cold-war period, so now must they be progressively unwound. Indeed, progress will only be possible if at each step in the process each side is satisfied that its security has not been jeopardized.

Starting a Downward Spiral

The important thing, however, is that the downward spiral be started. Such a start, we hope, is being made in the Middle East. We continue to search for ways in which it can be given added momentum in Vietnam. And the final communique of the April meeting of NATO foreign ministers explicitly embraced this objective for Europe.

Movement on the resolution of political issues will also be helpful to negotiations on arms control. Such negotiations are likely to be productive only in a climate of rationality. The mutual limitation of strategic weapons could, aside from its more direct benefits, also be useful as a catlytic factor leading to an additional lessening of tensions and to further agreements.

We know that we have moved in the last few years into a more fluid and open international political situation. But if we are to find out more precisely where we are in East-West relations, we must gain new evidence. We must seek ways to create new confidence. We must strive to replace antagonism with analysis and negation with negotiation.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Expresses Views on ROTC, Draft, ABM

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do those things that have been done, to try at first providing notice of these assignments as far as possible in advance so the families will have a chance to plan their affairs and to provide them for assistance in housing and other kinds of assistance as will help alleviate the difficulty. It would certainly be better if the families could accompany the servicemen wherever possible. But there are going to continue to be places where this isn't feasible.

Q—Sir, over the past year our educational institutions have experienced quite an uprising, especially against ROTC. Is this vital source of officer material in difficulty now?

A—Well, I have been very concerned about the attitude of our, you might say, radical students and professors at these universities—the group that is behind the objections of the ROTC. We have been putting a little attention on this. I don't think this is going to be a serious problem in the over-all sense because there are still many schools and universities where ROTC is acceptable and, in fact, we have a number of schools and universities that do not now have ROTC units who would like to have them. At the same time, we think it's important to have ROTC units at some of our better universities and we are working with the presidents of some of the Ivy League schools and other schools to find ways in which we can improve the programs so that it will, to the extent possible, meet the needs of the academic community and also meet the needs of our Armed Services. There have been some things in the way ROTC programs were handled and administered in the past that need to be improved and I think we are already finding some ways in which this can be done. I believe that we will find ways in which we can continue to have ROTC programs at our major colleges and universities and I think myself that this has been a very important source of officers in the past, and I think it will continue to be in the future.

Q—If by chance this source should dry up for gaining commissioned officers, has any thought been given to turning toward the enlisted ranks?

A—Well, we haven't yet come to the conclusion that we are in danger of having this source dry up, and so no real serious consideration has been given toward turning more to the enlisted rank. I hope we continue to use our enlisted men, to program upgrading to provide opportunities for them to move into the officer ranks. That's very important. I don't see this as competitive with the ROTC program yet.

Q—Sir, industry uses educational programs as retention incentives. Does the Defense Department plan to use this approach?

A—Well, we have some plans under way to increase educational opportunities for men in the services. I don't know that I can say how much this will be as an incentive for retention. I think it can very well be an incentive for the Service, and I myself feel that we can provide opportunities for education for the men who enlist. This should be an incentive for the Services to be more attractive for our young people. And we hope to find ways in which we can increase the opportunities for self-development of our people in the Armed Services.

Q—Mr. Secretary, do you see in the future a complete elimination of the draft?

A—Well, that's a difficult question to answer. I guess it depends upon what the level of Armed Services the country will require. You may recall we had no draft for many, many years before 1940 and if we go back to the level of very low numbers in the Armed Services I think we will probably always have to have a draft as a standby mechanism to meet requirements that might come about through international situations which require large forces.

Q—Even if we should find a way to break with this draft system, isn't it sort of against the tradition that all American able bodied men should serve their country?

A—Well, I must say that I have a little trouble with the philosophy of whether we should get rid of the draft or not. I think that there's a lot to be said for the general proposition that all young people should serve their country in some way. There have been some proposals directed toward a national service where all young people would serve in the Army or in some other way. Unfortunately these proposals are too expensive and too comprehensive and therefore not very realistic. But as I say, I think there's a good deal to be said for the philosophy of the draft, quite apart from whether you are able to provide the necessary strength, with or without.

Q—Sir, the image of the soldiers, sailors, Marines or airmen seemingly has changed in recent years. How are we doing to redress the situation?

A—Well, in the first place I don't think the image has changed quite as badly as you would conclude from reading in the newspapers because the newspapers report on all activities of radicals and all of their comments, and I think the appreciation of the Armed services is still quite high in the United States. I think the majority of the people have a great deal of respect for the young people who are serving their country and it seems to me that we need to continue to bring to the attention the important jobs these young people are doing on behalf of their country.

Q—Sir, without prejudging the Presidential committee on Governmental reorganization, what problems or what basic concepts do you see for your organization?

A—We are, of course, looking at ways in which we can improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of the DoD. Obviously we consider that to be part of our job. One of the things that we are looking at I have already mentioned—that is to move toward a decentralization program and get some of the decision-making spread on a wider basis. We are also moving toward giving our professional military people more responsibility for

recommendations and plans having to do with military affairs, and again related to general concept of giving the people who have the responsibility of doing the job the opportunity to make the decisions relating to their job. There are obviously a great many things that can be done to improve an organization that's as large as the Defense Department. Many steps have been taken in the past that have been helpful. We have programs involving consolidation of activities, the common purchasing among the three Services. There are all sorts of areas which can be improved, I think from where we are, just a continuation of some of the things that have been done over the past few years.

The Blue Ribbon panel which has been assembled now is to take on an overall look at the DoD and hopefully make recommendations that will work toward the improvement of effectiveness and efficiency. One of the problems we have—both Secretary Laird and I—we have quite a few things to do on a day-to-day basis. We don't have quite as much time to sit down and look at the over-all problems, so one of the benefits of this Blue Ribbon panel is to get together a group of people who will spend full time looking at these problems.

I think we will look at the organization structure. We will look at procedure and I am confident that there will be some areas of improvement. I don't think we will solve all our problems though in a matter of a year or so.

Q—The Blue Ribbon panel will be about a year in coming up with a large re-organization proposal. Do you have anything in the interim? I'm thinking more especially about the decentralization concept you mentioned. Will there be something specific unveiled related to this concept?

A—Well, we are already working on this concept and my approach has been to take specific areas and take some action in those areas and see what kind of problem we develop. We are already moving toward giving the Services what I hope will be a better responsibility on weapons systems procurement. We are looking at the top organization to see where we can recombine functions and provide some efficiency so we will have an ongoing program, looking at accomplishing those things which we can move into right away. And I hope and believe we will be working closely with the panel so there may be some things that they will suggest that we can implement before the final report is in.

Q—Sir, you hear about the Arms race day in and day out. Is there a possibility that we may reach an accord or an arms agreement with the Soviet Union?

A—I think there is a possibility and I think this is a very, very important objective for the country. There are a good many problems in terms of working out the plans to move into the talks and working out the details but it's encouraging to note that our Soviet adversaries, or friends however you want to put it, have given some indication that they are seriously interested in working out an arrangement in accommodation with the United States on armed limitations and perhaps on other matters. And we have been studying this question very thoroughly in the department, having to prepare for the strategic arms limitations talks. It's difficult for me to make a firm prediction on how it is going to come out but I can at least say that I am hopeful that we can make some progress.

Q—If we start moving to an arms control situation why are we deploying the ABM or talking of deploying the ABM?

A—Well, we have studied this question rather thoroughly, when we reviewed the ABM program early in the spring when we first started. It was our conclusion that the ABM would not be a deterrent to the initiation of arms limitations talks. Rather, it was a step which would protect our deterrent capability and which would in no way be threatening in terms of giving us what you might call damage-limiting capability or first-strike capability against the Soviets. Furthermore, the Russians had already undertaken substantial steps toward an ABM program on their own and we had no indication that they would have concern about it. Now, the other thing that is very important in terms of the Safeguard program which the President has recommended is that the Phase I which we are now asking Congress to approve does not, in fact, commit us to any large over-all deployment. Phase I is really in the nature of an initial prototype step to enable us to complete the detail engineering work, put the whole system together, and be sure it will work as a system, and it is necessary for us to do this now, to begin to do this, this year. Because, in order to com-

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David Packard was sworn in as Deputy Secretary of Defense Jan. 24, 1969. Prior to assuming his new position, Mr. Packard was chairman of the board and chief executive officer of the Hewlett-Packard Company of Palo Alto, Calif.

He was born in Pueblo, Colo., Sept. 7, 1912.

Mr. Packard was graduated from Stanford University with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in 1934. He then began post-graduate study at the University of Colorado, subsequently entered business and then returned to Stanford University to receive his Electrical Engineering Degree in 1939.

At Stanford, Mr. Packard received letters in football and basketball, served as president of his social fraternity, Alpha Delta Phi, and held membership in Phi Beta Kappa, Tau Beta Pi and Sigma Xi.

From 1958 to 1960, Mr. Packard served as president of the Board of Trustees of Stanford.

Mr. Packard is the recipient of a number of awards including a silver anniversary All-America Award from Sports Illustrated magazine in 1958; the American Way of Life Award in 1963, presented annually by the Pueblo Sertoma Club to a Coloradoan who has achieved national recognition for public service; and the Herbert Hoover Medal in 1966, the highest honor awarded by the Stanford University Alumni Association.

He is married to the former Lucile Salter of San Francisco. They have four children — David Woodley, Nancy (Mrs. Robin Burnett), Susan and Julie.

Facing camera are Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard (r) and Pentagon Forum moderator John C. Broger as panel members (back to camera) prepare to ask questions of the secretary during TV program.

U. S. Anxious to Undertake Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

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plete the development and put the whole system together to have two operating sites which we recommend operating in terms of their system integrity and their capability, will take until 1974 at the very earliest if we start right away. If it's decided that deployment of the full system is necessary, this will be evaluated continually, year by year, as the President indicated. If we decide in the next year or two that the full system was needed, it will be 1976 before it can be implemented in any case. So we hope some progress will be accomplished in the arms control talks before that time and so there's no reason to feel that the Phase I program that we recommended should in any way interfere with our ability to undertake arms control talks with the Soviets.

Q—In the interim, Mr. Secretary, what is your assessment of the Soviet and Chinese Communist threat to the United States?

A—Well, I think there's no question. If you look at the military capability of the Soviets, they have very strong, increasing capability in strategic nuclear weapons. That's one of the reasons why we are anxious to undertake the strategic arms limitations talks. They have very large land forces, substantial amounts of equipment. So is terms of capability, they do have a capability to generate a rather substantial threat. What the threat is, of course, is determined not only by capability but by your intentions and when you talk about the intentions of the Soviets we hope that they do not have any intentions over around Europe, or undertake other adventures of this sort. And I think for this reason we should be able to come to some understanding in these arms limitation talks, perhaps on other matters. But they do have a very strong military capability and we have the responsibility in the DoD to make sure we have the capability to deter them from undertaking any adventurous action.

Q—Mr. Packard, in the past few years, South Korea and the United States have been the recipients of several provocative acts on the part of the North Koreans. Would you clarify the DoD position on this and your appraisal of it?

A—I think we have to start with the basic proposition that Kim Il-sung (North Korea premier) in North Korea has stated a number of times that it is his objective to reunify Korea by military means, as necessary, and that he has taken a very hostile attitude. It's my view that the South Koreans, with our help, have very capable military forces. I was there this year for a few days and I think the South Koreans are quite able—with the help we have been able to provide them and the assistance to deter the North Koreans from undertaking any military attempt at South Korea. But the North Koreans are undertaking provocative acts. Their infiltrations to the DMZ, as I am sure you know, and infiltrations along the coast—those are probably going to continue and so there will be some harassment. This seems to be the attitude of the North Koreans and it will probably continue for some time. I do not see any serious threat in terms of war breaking out in Korea again in the near future.

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